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Laajennettu tiivistelmä  
(Executive summary in Finnish) 
Vuoden 2011 energiaverouudistus korotti energian valmisteveroja. Samalla polttoainei-
den verotus sidottiin osittain poltosta aiheutuviin hiilidioksidipäästöihin. Veronkorotus 
herätti huolen teollisuuden kustannuksista, ja vuoden 2012 alusta laajennettiin vuo-
desta 1998 käytössä ollutta teollisuuden energiaverojen palautusta aikaisempaa suu-
rempaan joukkoon yrityksiä. Uudistus moninkertaisti energiaveron palautuksiin oikeu-
tettujen yritysten määrän noin kymmenestä yli 140 yritykseen. Maksettujen palautusten 
arvo kasvoi samalla vajaasta 10 miljoonasta eurosta yli 200 miljoonaan euroon vuo-
dessa.  
Energiaverojen palautusten tavoitteena on tukea yritysten kykyä työllistää, tehdä inves-
tointeja ja kasvaa sekä ylläpitää Suomen kansainvälistä kilpailukykyä. Tämä tutkimus 
pyrkii arvioimaan energiaverojen palautusten vaikutuksia vertaamalla vuosina 2011–
2012 palautusten piiriin tulleiden ja ilman palautuksia jääneiden tuotantolaitosten kilpai-
lukykyä, työllisten määrää ja energian käyttöä. Kilpailukyvyllä tarkoitetaan tässä sitä, 
kuinka hyvin tuotantolaitokset ovat menestyneet tuotannon määrällä, liikevaihdolla ja 
arvonlisäyksellä mitattuna. Tutkimus hyödyntää Verohallinnon tietoja energiaverojen 
palautuksista ja Tilastokeskuksen Teollisuuden toimipaikkapaneelin tietoja tuotantolai-
tosten tuotoksesta, liikevaihdosta, arvonlisäyksestä sekä lukuisista taustamuuttujista. 
Lisäksi tutkimus käyttää Tilastokeskuksen Teollisuuden energiankäyttö -tilaston tietoja 
tuotantolaitosten energiapanoksista. Aineistoa on käytettävissä vuosilta 2007–2016.  
Veronpalautuksia saaneiden yritysten tuotantolaitoksille muodostettiin verrokkiryhmä 
etsimällä kullekin veronpalautusten piiriin 2011–2012 tulleelle tuotantolaitokselle taus-
taominaisuuksiltaan mahdollisimman samankaltaiset verrokit veronpalautuksia vaille 
jääneistä tuotantolaitoksista. Verrokit muodostettiin saman toimialan tuotantolaitok-
sista. Toimialarajauksen lisäksi kriteereinä verrokkien muodostamiselle käytettiin tuo-
tantolaitoksen energian käyttöä sekä sähkönkulutuksen suhdetta kokonaisenergian 
käyttöön verouudistusta edeltävinä vuosina 2007–2010. Koska palautusten piiriin vuo-
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sina 2011–2012 tulleet toimipaikat ovat yleisesti ottaen suurempia kuin ilman palautuk-
sia jääneet, ryhmien välille jää eroja mittakaavaan sidoksissa olevissa taustaominai-
suuksissa. Mittakaavaeroista mahdollisesti syntyvän harhan välttämiseksi vertailussa 
arvioitiin eroja tuotantolaitosten tulosten, työllisten määrän ja energiatehokkuuden ke-
hityksessä yli ajan, ei tasoeroja näiden muuttujien välillä yksittäisenä tarkasteluvuonna. 
Energiaverojen palautusten osuus vuosina 2011-2012 palautusten piiriin tulleiden yri-
tysten kustannuksista oli keskimäärin yksi prosentti ajanjaksolla 2012-2016. Jos ener-
giaintensiivisyyttä mitataan sähkön kulutuksella suhteessa kokonaiskustannuksiin, pa-
lautusten piiriin tulleet tuotantolaitokset eivät olleet erityisen energiaintensiivisiä verrat-
tuna ilman palautuksia jääneisiin tuotantolaitoksiin. Vuosina 2011–2012 energiaverojen 
palautusten piiriin tulleiden laitosten tuotannon arvon kehittyi vuosien 2010 ja 2016 vä-
lillä heikommin kuin ilman palautuksia jääneiden laitosten. Samoin tuotannon energia-
tehokkuuden kehitys jäi vuosina 2011–2012 energiaverojen palautusten piiriin tulleissa 
laitoksissa heikommaksi kuin ilman palautuksia jääneissä laitoksissa.  
Tutkimuksen tulokset tukevat eniten johtopäätöstä, että veronpalautuksilla ei ole ollut 
vaikutusta vuosista 2011–2012 alkaen palautusten piiriin kuuluneiden tuotantolaitosten 
liikevaihdon, arvonlisäyksen, palkkojen, työllisten määrän tai energian käytön kehityk-
seen, ja että niillä oli negatiivinen vaikutus tuotannon arvon ja energiatehokkuuden ke-
hitykseen. 
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1 Introduction 
Along with increasing policy effort to mitigate climate change, the impact of climate policy 
on firm performance has become a heated topic in the political debate. Especially in 
countries where climate policy has tightened significantly relative to competitors, con-
cerns have been raised about adverse effects of unilateral climate policies on manufac-
turing firm performance. In theory, the effect of environmental policy on firm performance 
could go either way. Other things equal, environmental regulation increases firms’ costs 
and thus reduces their cost competiveness. If firms compete in prices, the disadvantage 
relative to firms operating in locations with laxer environmental policies may harm regu-
lated firms’ sales and reduce their production, and eventually employment. Firms may 
also be pushed to shift production capacity to locations with laxer environmental policies 
with the consequence of pollution leakage, as predicted by the pollution haven hypoth-
esis (Levinson and Taylor 2008). An alternative view is expressed in the Porter hypoth-
esis, which states that environmental regulation may enhance the competitiveness of 
regulated firms, through pushing them to engage in environmentally friendly innovation 
and technology adoption that would not have happened in the absence of policy (Porter 
1991). Both in Finland and in the EU many policy makers have expressed the concern 
that EU’s ambitious climate policy will shift production to countries with laxer climate 
policy, while others have promoted the vision that low-carbon innovation will be a driver 
of competitive advantage and economic growth.  
 
Given the two theories with opposite predictions, the effect of environmental policy on 
manufacturing firm performance remains an empirical question. The environmental pol-
icy tools used in practice have also been changing. Regulators are increasingly adopting 
market-based instruments to curtail emissions. The shift from command and control ap-
proaches towards market-based instruments raises questions about how well these in-
struments work in terms of their environmental objectives. Causal evidence on both the 
effect of environmental policies on manufacturing firm performance and on what market-
based policies deliver in terms of emission reductions is still sparse, in particular in the 
context of climate policy.  
 
This paper seeks to evaluate the effect of an energy tax exemption on the economic and 
environmental performance of manufacturing firms. We examine these two issues in the 
context of Finland’s “green” energy tax reform that substantially increased the excise 
taxes on energy inputs, with the aim of promoting energy efficiency and reducing CO2-
emissions. The preparation of the tax reform was accompanied by controversy over the 
predicted effects on manufacturing firm competitiveness, with the consequence that 
firms above a certain energy tax threshold were granted exemption from energy taxes. 
While firms below the threshold pay energy taxes in full, firms above the threshold are 
refunded up to 85 percent of their energy taxes. Exempt and non-exempt firms, and in 
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particular plants within these firms, can be otherwise very similar. The exemption rule is 
important from a statistical analysis point of view in that it allows us to compare plants 
that operate in the same manufacturing sectors and have otherwise similar history, but 
have been subject to different effective tax rates since the tax reform.  
In order to evaluate the causal impact of the energy tax exemption on manufacturing 
firms’ economic and environmental performance, we use a detailed data set on the 
universe of Finnish manufacturing plants, combined with comprehensive plant-level in-
formation on energy consumption. We exploit the detailed information to estimate the 
impact of the energy tax exemption by combining a difference-in-differences approach 
with semiparametric matching techniques. 
Overall the results presented here are most compatible with no important effect of the 
energy tax refund on employees, wages or energy use on average, and, if anything, a 
negative impact on gross output and energy efficiency. 
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2 Literature review 
Literature on international trade generally groups the main determinants of firms’ inter-
national competitiveness into three broad categories: firm level factors, sector level fac-
tors, and country/region specific factors. Firm level factors have generally been found to 
be the most important determinants of both domestic and international competitiveness 
(see e.g. Goddard et al. 2005, Goddard et al. 2009, Brakman et al. 2009, Wagner 2012). 
Hottman et al. (2016) and Crozet et al. (2012) have identified perceived product and firm 
quality (firm appeal) as the most important firm-level driver of competitiveness. Hottman 
et al. (2016) analyzed the sales and prices of millions of products in the United States in 
years 2004-2001. They found that product quality accounted for 50-75 percent of firm-
level success factors and 90 percent of sales increases. Prices and costs instead ex-
plained only 25 percent of the general success of a firm, and for the majority of products 
changes in costs had no effect on sales development.  
There are only few studies on the effect of energy or carbon taxes on the competitive-
ness of manufacturing firms. Arlinghaus (2015) provides a fairly recent literature review 
and concludes that carbon taxes or EU emissions trading have had little impact on com-
petitiveness at the firm, sector or country level. According to Arlinghaus, carbon pricing 
has had some success in reducing firms’ energy intensity and carbon emissions, while 
tax relief to energy-intensive industries has not affected competitiveness indicators in 
manufacturing.  
Finland’s energy tax refund system has previously been studied by Harju et al. (2016). 
Harju et al. analyzed the tax exemption at firm-level and focused on the association 
between tax refunds and firm performance. They found no evidence of robust, statisti-
cally significant association between energy tax refunds and measures of firm perfor-
mance. We complement the work in Harju et al. (2016) by analyzing more detailed plant-
level data and a time period five years after the reform, which adds a more long-term 
view as plants will have had more time to adjust to the changes in the tax schedule. 
Furthermore, we use an identification strategy that allows for estimating the causal im-
pact of the tax exemption policy. We also examine effects on plants’ energy use and 
energy efficiency, not included in the analysis by Harju et al. (2016).  
Further studies closely related to the present paper have examined the effects of similar 
tax exemptions on manufacturing firm performance in other EU countries. Gerster and 
Lamp (2018) analyzed a tax exemption to large manufacturing plants in Germany. They 
examined a change in the tax schedule in 2012 that reduced the threshold of electricity 
use above which plants are exempt. Newly exempt plants were found to increase their 
energy use some but their sales did not increase. The number of employees in newly 
exempt plants decreased some, which Gerster and Lamp suggest could be because 
they substituted bought electricity for generation on site. Flues and Lutz (2015) studied 
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the effects of German electricity taxation prior to EU Emissions Trading, in years 1999-
2005. They used a regression discontinuity approach and exploited a threshold in the 
electricity tax system which assigned a lower tax rate to industries with high electricity 
use. They found no effect of the tax relief on firm revenue, exports, value added, invest-
ments or employment. Martin et al. (2014) analyzed the effects of energy taxes in the 
United Kingdom, also prior to EU Emissions Trading. The United Kingdom granted en-
ergy-intensive manufacturing firms an 80 percent concession in their energy taxes if they 
committed to voluntary agreements to reduce their energy use or carbon emissions. The 
energy use or carbon emission targets, however, were not very ambitious. Martin et al. 
used a differences-in-differences approach and instrumental variables to study the ef-
fects of the tax relief. They found that paying the full tax had no effect on production, 
productivity or employment but that it reduced firm energy intensity notably relative to 
firms that obtained the tax relief.  
Anger and Oberndorfer (2008) examined the effect of the free allocation of emissions 
permits to German firms participating in the EU Emissions Trading System. While the 
research design differs from those in Flues and Lutz (2015) and Martin et al. (2014), the 
initial free allocation of emission permits can be perceived as support to energy-intensive 
manufacturing, similar to tax relief. Anger and Oberndorfer found no difference in the 
profitability or employment in manufacturing firms that would have been attributable to a 
firm having been overallocated free emission permits or having to buy emissions permits 
from the market in 2005.1 
A closely related literature studies the effects of EU emissions trading on manufacturing 
firm performance and CO2-emissions. Dechezleprêtre et al. (2018) used data for all EU 
countries, for altogether 1800 firms that participate in emissions trading. They compared 
regulated firms to firms that are otherwise very similar but not regulated. They found no 
evidence of negative effects of EU emissions trading on firm performance. Regulated 
firms’ revenue and fixed assets were instead found to have increased, perhaps due to 
investments by regulated firms in cleaner and at the same time more efficient technolo-
gies.  
Similar conclusions can be drawn based on studies for individual EU countries. In 
France, EU emissions trading increased investment in regulated firms, without overall 
impacts on employment or value added (Wagner, Muûls, Martin and Colmer 2014). Re-
sults were similar for Germany (Petrick and Wagner 2014). In Norway, emissions trading 
appears to have increased productivity and value added some, although the result may 
be due to generous free allocation of emissions permits (Klemetsen, Rosendahl and 
                                                     
 
1 The prices of emission permits in the EU ETS were substantially higher in 2005, prior to the first 
emissions reports being published in April 2006, than in 2006-2007. Once the first emissions re-
ports came out, prices collapsed, reaching zero towards the end of the first EU ETS phase in 2005-
2007.  
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Jakobsen 2016). For Lithuania, no effect was found on firm performance (Jaraite and Di 
Maria 2016).  
Finally, Marin and Vona (2017) utilized a detailed data set on manufacturing plant energy 
expenditure and energy use, which allowed them to calculate plant-specific energy 
prices. They found energy prices to have a small negative impact on employment and 
productivity: a 10 percent increase in energy prices decreased employment by 2,6 per-
cent and productivity by 1,1 percent.   
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3 Institutional setting  
3.1 Finland’s 2011 energy tax reform and 
change in energy tax exemption rule 
Finland’s 2011 energy tax reform markedly increased the excise tax rates on coal, nat-
ural gas, oil and electricity.2 As a follow-up of the reform, a pre-existing tax exemption 
for large energy-intensive firms was expanded to a substantially larger set of firms.3 The 
stated motivation for the tax exemption was securing the international competitiveness 
of Finland’s energy-intensive export industries, by attenuating the energy cost increase 
brought along by the tax increase.4  
The exemption rule is based on firms’ energy tax payments relative to their value added, 
a measure of energy intensity. The energy taxes are excise taxes, and energy tax pay-
ments are thus determined based on the quantities of energy inputs purchased. If a firm’s 
taxes on electricity and fuels within an accounting period exceeded 0,5 percent of its 
value added, it will be refunded 85 percent of difference, subject to a 50 000 euro de-
ductible. Formally, the tax exemption rule is 
                        
Refund = (Energy taxes paid - value added*0,005)*0,85 - 50 000 (eur). 5 
Energy taxes include excise taxes on electricity, district heat and process steam produc-
tion, and carbon and energy content based taxes on heating fuels. Value added com-
prises operating profit (- loss), write-offs, depreciation, and labor costs (total of wages 
and social benefits).  Firms apply for the tax refund annually based on certified accounts.  
Through 2011, the exemption rule entitled only firms whose energy tax payments ex-
ceeded 3,7 percent of value added to be granted the exemption. The tax legislation was 
changed in December 2011 to lower the threshold from 3,7 to 0,5 percent from January 
                                                     
 
2 The energy tax reform changed both the structure of energy taxation and energy tax rates so 
that the excise taxes on fuels comprised of an energy content component and a CO2 component. 
The CO2 tax rate used in computing the excise tax on different energy products increased from 20 
EUR/tCO2 to 30 EUR/tCO2. 
3 The tax exemption was first implemented in September 1998. 
4 HE 129/2011 v 295783 - Proposal by the Government to the Parliament to amend Section 8a of 
the Act on Excise Duty on Electricity and Certain Fuels. In Finnish, HE 129/2011 vp 295783 - 
Hallituksen esitys Eduskunnalle laiksi sähkön ja eräiden polttoaineiden valmisteverosta annetun 
lain 8 a §:n muuttamisesta.  
5 A negative value added replaced by zero in the calculation.  
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2012 onwards, following an outcry from the industry after the energy tax rates were in-
creased in the beginning of 2011. The changes in the energy tax rates and exemption 
threshold together brought along a notable increase in both the total amount of the tax 
refunds and the number of recipients. When only 13 firms received a refund in 2011, the 
number of recipients increased to more than 140 after 2012. The total amount of taxes 
refunded increased from 7 million euros to over 200 million euros a year. 
 
Figure 3.1. summarizes the change in the number of firms receiving energy tax refunds 
(solid line), the amount of tax refunds paid from 2003 onwards, and the composition of 
the group of tax refund recipients in terms of the industrial sector. In terms of industries, 
paper manufacturing has received the largest proportion of the energy tax refunds, fol-
lowed by chemical and plastic manufacturing and metals and minerals manufacturing.  
 
Figure 3.1. The total amount of energy tax refunds and the number of refund re-
cipient firms from 2003 to 2016.  
 
 
Sources: Finnish Tax Administration and Customs Finland.  
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3.2 Hypothesized effects of the energy tax 
exemption 
A natural starting point for evaluating the effects of the energy tax exemption is provided 
by the policy objectives stated when the energy tax exemption was extended in 2011. 
The stated policy objectives were as follows: promote the ability of energy intensive 
firms to employ, invest, and grow, as well as maintain Finland’s international competi-
tiveness.6 The objectives were not clarified further in the legislative proposal. Compet-
itiveness is an ambiguous term, so a discussion of the effects that we seek to measure 
is warranted before proceeding to our analysis.  
In terms of a firm, competiveness would in general be interpreted as a strong market 
position and profitability above that of competitors. The mechanism through which one 
would expect the energy tax refund to affect firms’ market position and performance is 
through a cost competitiveness channel. Other things equal, the energy tax exemption 
reduces the relative unit energy cost of the tax exempt firms relative to their competitors. 
If the firms produce goods that compete in prices, the lower unit energy cost should 
enable tax exempt firms to reduce their prices and increase their sales relative to their 
competitors. Even if the firms produce goods that are at least to some extent differenti-
ated and hence do not compete entirely in prices, the lower unit energy cost could still 
result in both lower prices and increased sales. Increased sales in turn would be mani-
fested as increased output, employment and, in the case of energy intensive industries, 
energy use.  
Our data include three output measures that can be used as firm performance indica-
tors: gross output, revenue and value added. The output measures are defined as fol-
lows. Gross output measures the value of a plant’s total output. Revenue measures the 
sales of the plant’s output. Gross output differs from revenue in that in addition to sales, 
it includes output used by the plant itself, deliveries to the owner firm’s other plants, and 
changes in storage. Value added in turn measures the difference between the value of 
total output and production costs, excluding labor costs. We also observe the number 
of employees and energy use in each plant. We hypothesize that the effect of the unit 
energy cost reduction produced by the tax exemption would show as an increase in 
gross output, revenue, value added, employment and energy use.  
                                                     
 
6 HE 129/2011 v 295783 - Proposal by the Government to the Parliament to amend Section 8a of 
the Act on Excise Duty on Electricity and Certain Fuels. In Finnish, HE 129/2011 vp 295783 - 
Hallituksen esitys Eduskunnalle laiksi sähkön ja eräiden polttoaineiden valmisteverosta annetun 
lain 8 a §:n muuttamisesta.  
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It is also possible that the tax refunds will be in part passed through to compensation 
for other factors of production, such as worker wages, or routed to executives and 
shareholders. If increased sales led to increased wage growth, the cost competitive-
ness advantage provided by the energy tax exemption could be offset by increased 
labor costs. To shed on light whether such pass-through has occurred, we assess 
whether energy tax refunds have led to increased wage growth in exempt plants.   
As cost competitiveness is jointly determined by the unit costs of inputs and firms’ 
productivity, the effect of the energy tax exemption on productivity measures is also of 
interest in terms of long-term competitiveness. In the case of energy intensive indus-
tries, energy efficiency (output per unit of energy) is particularly relevant. Firms facing 
higher unit energy prices could, for example, invest more in energy efficiency improve-
ments, which in turn would reduce the cost competitiveness gap – a one percent reduc-
tion in the unit cost of energy would be offset by a one percent increase in energy 
efficiency.  
Table 3.1 shows the size of the energy tax refunds relative to the total expenses of the 
energy tax exempt firms in the main refund recipient industries. Overall, the refunds 
have corresponded to approximately 1 percent of the total expenses of the refund re-
cipient firms. The size of the refunds relative to total expenses has been highest in food 
products, ranging from slightly under 1 to over 3 percent, followed by paper and paper 
products at slightly over 1 percent, and chemical products at slightly under 1 percent.   
Table 3.1. Energy tax refunds relative to the total expenses for firms that 
started receiving energy tax refunds in 2011-2012  
Industry 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
      
Food products 3,11 % 0,94 % 1,00 % 1,34 % 1,45 % 
Lumber 0,14 % 0,19 % 0,16 % 0,21 % 0,29 % 
Paper and paper products 1,25 % 1,16 % 1,20 % 1,12 % 1,07 % 
Chemical products 0,66 % 0,80 % 0,86 % 0,97 % 1,18 % 
Non-metallic minarals 0,02 % 0,48 % 0,42 % 0,45 % 0,55 % 
Metal processing 0,46 % 0,35 % 0,34 % 0,35 % 0,37 % 
All industries 1,17 % 0,91 % 0,93 % 1,03 % 1,18 % 
Source: Own calculations using data from Finnish Tax Administration and Statistics Finland 
Business Register. Notation “..” means that there were fewer than three firms in the cell and 
the results cannot be reported due to data confidentiality restrictions.  
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4 Research design 
4.1 Difference-in-differences matching 
estimator 
We seek to identify the average effect of energy tax exemption on plants within firms 
that qualified for the exemption as a consequence of the 2011-2012 energy tax reform. 
To identify this parameter, we adopt a difference-in-differences matching approach sim-
ilar to the one used for example in Fowlie, Holland and Mansur (2012), Petrick and Wag-
ner (2014), Wagner, Muûls, Martin and Colmer (2014) and Gerster and Lamp (2018). 
The approach exploits the longitudinal structure of our dataset and the rich information 
on plant characteristics, both in terms of economic variables and energy use.  
 
In line with the potential outcome framework, let (1)iY  denote the outcome of plant i when 
the plant is energy tax refund recipient, and (0)iY  when the plant is not eligible for an 
energy tax refund. Let Di denote the treatment indicator, and subscripts t and t’ pre- and 
post-treatment periods, respectively. Let X denote a set of covariates. We seek to iden-
tify the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT):   
 
      ' '[ (1) (0)| 1]ATT it it iE Y Y Dα = − = ,                               (1) 
 
where t’ refers to year following the 2011-2012 tax reform and ATTα  measures the aver-
age effect of the tax exemption on annual plant level outcome. The fundamental evalu-
ation problem here is that outcome ' (0)itY is not observed for the treated plants. The 
matching approach constructs estimates of these counterfactual outcomes using out-
comes observed for untreated plants that are observationally similar to the to the treated 
plant. The ATT can then be estimated from the sample equivalent of the expression 
 
( ) ( )' '[ 1 | , 1] [ 0 | , 0]it i it iE Y X D E Y X D= − =  ,                 (2) 
 
assuming conditional independence between outcomes and treatment status, 
⊥' '( (0), (1)) | .it ity y D X  Unfortunately, in light of the fact that eligibility for the energy tax 
exemption is defined by an energy tax payment threshold, the unconfoundness assump-
tion appears too demanding for the policy context here.  
 
However, the ATT can be identified under weaker assumptions by exploiting longitudinal 
information and focusing on differences-in-differences (DiD) outcomes. Heckman, 
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Ichimura and Todd (1997) suggest estimating the ATT from the sample analogues of the 
population moments 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )', ' '(X) E 1 0 | , 1 E 0 0 | , 0t t it it i it it iD Y Y X D Y Y X D= − = − − =        . (3) 
 
To implement this, they suggest the following semiparametric conditional DiD matching 
estimator:  
 
   ATTα
� = ( ) ( ) ( )( )0 0
1 0
' '
1
1 (1) 0 0 .jt jk ktjt kt
j I k I
Y Y w Y Y
N ∈ ∈
  − − − 
  
∑ ∑                                     (4) 
 
Here, N1 is the number of plants in the treatment group of refund recipients, I1 the set of 
refund recipients and I0 the set of plants not receiving energy tax refunds. The refund 
recipients are indexed by j and the non-recipients by k. Plant k is given weight wjk when 
constructing the counterfactual estimate for treated plant j. The weight determines the 
extent to which counterfactual observation k contributes to the estimated treatment ef-
fect. The more similar a control plant k is to the treated plant j, the greater weight wjk it 
receives. The specific weighting procedure depends on the matching algorithm.  
4.2 Identifying assumptions 
Our identification strategy is based on the following identifying assumptions: 
1. The matching estimator identifies the ATT under the assumption that  
 
    ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )' '0 0 , 1 0 0 , 0it it it itE Y Y P X D E Y Y P X D   − = = − =               (5) 
 
(Heckman, Ichimura and Todd 1998). In our application the assumption means that 
the counterfactual trends in the outcomes of the tax exempt plants do not systemat-
ically differ from those in the group of matched control plants. In other words, we 
assume that conditional on the matching variables the outcome variables of the ex-
empt and non-exempt firms would have followed a parallel trend after the 2011 en-
ergy tax reform, had the exempt firms not become eligible for tax refunds.  
 
2. A further identifying assumption is that matching is performed on a common support 
( )( )1X S P X D∈ =  where the distributions of the covariates in the treatment and 
control groups overlap.  
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3. Finally, in order to rule out spillovers and general equilibrium effects, it must also be 
the case the potential outcomes at one plant are independent of the treatment status 
of other plants. This assumption is generally referred to as the stable unit treatment 
value assumption.  
 
It is possible to test the common support assumption (2), whereas the parallel trends 
assumption (1) and  stable unit treatment value assumption (3) are not directly test-
able. We will next introduce our data and matching algorithm, and then evaluate how 
plausible these assumptions are in light of descriptive statistics (Section 5.4) and 
indirect tests (Section 6).  
 
Note that control plants do not need to be exact matches for treated plants in terms 
of observable characteristics. The matching algorithm has to determine a tolerance 
limit for how different control plants can be from a treated plant and still be a match.  
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5 Data and matching algorithm 
5.1 Data sources 
Our principal dataset is the Longitudinal Database on Plants in Finnish Manufacturing 
(LDPM) panel from Statistics Finland. The LDPM panel starts from 1974 and comprises 
annual data from the universe of Finnish manufacturing plants that belong to firms with 
at least 20 employees. The dataset contains information on a wide range of economic 
variables such as revenue, value added, employment, wages, investment, total expendi-
ture and the shares of electricity and other fuels in the total expenditure. The data are 
collected annually as part of a survey that compiles data for the Structural Business 
Statistics database of Statistics Finland. Firms are obliged to reply based on the Statis-
tics Act (Act 280/04). We use LDPM data for the years 2007-2016. 
 
Our other essential dataset is the Energy Use in Manufacturing database of Statistics 
Finland which starts from 2007 and provides establishment-level information on the use 
of electricity, heat and over 20 different fuel types. The data are collected through an 
annual survey that covers establishments in manufacturing and mining.7 Again, firms are 
obliged to reply based on the Statistics Act (Act 280/04).  
 
The complete list of energy tax refund recipient firms and refund sums for years 2007-
2016 was obtained from the Finnish Tax Administration. The information was merged 
with the LPDM panel and energy use databases for years 2007-2016 by Statistics Fin-
land on the basis of confidential firm identification numbers. The combined dataset con-
tains information on establishment level economic outcomes, expenditure and energy 
use and firm level information on tax refunds for years 2007-2016. 
5.2 Matching sample construction 
The sample of plants that is used in each matching analysis is constructed as follows. 
From the overall combined dataset, we use plants that were in the data set in 2007 to 
2010, the years before Finland’s energy tax reform that our energy use data cover, and 
in at least one of the years 2015-2016. These plants are divided into treatment and com-
parison groups. The treatment group in the base case analysis includes plants that first 
qualified for the energy tax exemption in 2011 or 2012, and remained tax exempt through 
2016. The comparison group only includes plants have never been tax exempt. That is, 
                                                     
 
7 Establishments of ten or fewer employees are only included every fourth year. 
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we remove plants that were exempt from energy taxes already prior to the 2011 energy 
tax reform, and plants that first became exempt after the tax reform but did not qualify in 
all the years 2012-2016. These plants have a lower intensity of treatment overall than 
the plants that were always exempt once they first qualified for the exemption. Firms pay 
energy taxes on the fuel and electricity that they use in their production process and are 
only refunded taxes exceeding the threshold after the end of the accounting period. 
Firms form expectations about the energy tax refunds that they incorporate into their 
production and investment decisions. In case of firms that were eligible for the refund 
every year after the 2011 reform we proceed from the assumption that firms form rational 
expectations about their future energy tax refunds based on their previous energy taxes 
and refunds. Expectations regarding future tax refunds are less clear for plants that qual-
ified in some years but did not in others. Future work should consider an alternative 
specification that includes these plants. Furthermore, we remove plants for which infor-
mation is missing on any of the observational characteristics that are used in matching 
and regressions for the pre-reform year 2010. For the baseline results on treatment ef-
fect on the treated for the post-reform years 2015 to 2016, we use all possible observa-
tions, irrespective of whether some or all of the information might be missing for some 
of the other years 2012 to 2016.  
5.3 Matching algorithm 
The nonparametric matching estimator constructs the counterfactual outcome estimate 
for each treatment plant using the control plants that most closely resemble the treatment 
plants. We use nearest neighbor covariate matching to construct the sample of plants 
that we use in the DiD matching analysis. We pair treatment and control plants by se-
lecting for each treatment plant i the m nearest neighbors that most closely resemble it 
in terms of selected covariates. The m nearest neighbors receive a weight 1/m while the 
weights for all other untreated (non-exempt) plants are set equal to zero. In our base 
specification, we use 5 nearest neighbors.  
 
As suggested by Abadie and Imbens (2006, 2011), we augment the matching estimation 
with a regression-based bias adjustment so as to mitigate potential bias introduced by 
poor match quality. That is, after matching the treated plants with m nearest neighbors, 
within-pair differences are adjusted using a parametric regression of the control outcome 
on a set of covariates.  
 
Our specification matches exactly on the Statistics Finland TOL 2008 industry code. That 
is, control plants matched to each treated plant are required to be in the same industry 
as the treated plant. The industry classification is likely to be correlated with unobserved 
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determinants of plant-level economic outcomes, including production technology char-
acteristics and demand for the good produced by the plant.  
Our continuous matching variables are plants’ total energy use and share of electricity 
in total energy use in the pretreatment period. The larger the number of variables used 
for matching, the less accurately can one match on those variables that do not require 
exact matching. This speaks for a parsimonious specification.  
Energy taxes paid would be a natural matching covariate. Unfortunately we only ob-
serve energy taxes for the exempt plants and thus cannot use them for matching. In-
stead, we employ energy use as a proxy for both a plant’s energy tax burden and the 
plant’s size.8 Energy use is a better measure of plant size than the often-used measure 
employment in the case of energy intensive industries, where production processes are 
highly automized. Given a plant’s total energy use, the share of electricity in total energy 
further approximates the plant’s energy tax burden. The taxes on most fossil energy 
sources were increased substantially more than the tax on industrial electricity use in 
the 2011 energy tax reform, and have also been on the rise in the consequent years 
while the tax on industrial electricity use has remained at its 2011 level (see Figure 5.1. 
below). Thus, given total energy use, a higher share of electricity in a plant’s energy 
mix is assumed to translate into a smaller energy tax burden. 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the differences in the tax rates for different energy sources  and 
the changes in the tax rates following the 2011 energy tax reform. To enable straight-
forward comparison of energy taxes across energy sources we have expressed the 
taxes for all energy sources in terms of euro cents per MJ.  
There are a variety of matching algorithms to choose from, and within the nearest neigh-
bor matching algorithm used here several different choices of matching covariates can 
be justified. For example, plants’ energy tax exposure could be measured by the ratio 
of electricity use to their total expenditure. We also experimented with a propensity 
score matching estimator, which seeks to describe the process by which the plants are 
selected into treatment. Although matching on propensity scores balances treatment 
and control plants across the set of covariates used to estimate the propensity scores, 
plants with very similar propensity scores may have different combinations of observa-
ble characteristics. In our case, we found that matching on propensity scores did not 
always imply a close match on observables. Consequently, our preferred matching 
                                                     
 
8 Among the tax refund recipients, whose energy taxes we observe, energy use correlates highly 
with the energy taxes paid. We also experimented with calculating energy taxes on basis of plants’ 
energy mix but did not obtain satisfactory results. The likely explanation for large discrepancies 
between calculated and realized energy tax payments is that fuels used in an industrial process 
are not subject to excise taxes. Process use and heating fuel use are not distinguished in our data.   
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specification and the results presented in this report rely on simple nearest neighbor 
matching.  
Figure 5.1. Tax rates for different energy sources 2010-2018. The taxes comprise the energy content tax and 
CO2-tax (security of supply and value added taxes are not included). 
 
5.4 Descriptive statistics  
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 present descriptive statistics of the financial and energy use variables 
of the plants used in the econometric analysis. Altogether 128 plants in our data first 
became eligible for the tax refund in 2011 or 2012 and continued to receive tax refunds 
every year thereafter. The table displays the plants that have been eligible for the energy 
tax refund starting 2011 or 2012 but not before, then the matched control plants, and the 
overall group of newly tax exempt and matched control plants.  
 
Note that the tax exemption rule applies to firms, not to plants. A firm here refers to a tax 
identification number given by the Finnish Patent and Registration Office or the Tax Ad-
ministration. While firms’ taxes are determined at the level of each tax identification num-
ber, a tax paying unit is not necessarily equivalent to a corporate decision making entity. 
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Some corporations have collected all of their operations in Finland under one tax identi-
fication number, whereas others have divided their operations under several tax identi-
fication numbers so that even a single plant may be a tax paying unit. As the tax exemp-
tion rule applies to the total energy taxes paid by a tax identification number, plants within 
corporations that have collected all of their plants under one tax identification number 
are more likely to have energy tax payments that exceed the tax refund threshold than 
plants operated as separate tax paying units.9 Plants within these two types of corporate 
structures may be similar in terms of size, gross output, value added and other charac-
teristics, which helps us in finding matches for the treated plants that are similar in ob-
servable characteristics.  
 
Overall plants in the new energy tax refund recipient group are still larger on average 
and more heterogeneous than plants in the full sample or non-recipient control plants, 
as measured by gross output, revenue, value added, or number of employees (Table 
5.1). On average the new tax refund recipients also used more energy in total but were 
less energy efficient than the control plants. The energy mix of the newly exempt plants 
is less dominated by electricity (35 percent) than that of the control plants (44 percent).  
Of the new recipient plants, 91 percent belong in a multiplant firm. The proportion is 
lower in the group of the non-exempt control plants (41 percent).   
 
Table 5.1. Descriptive statistics of the financial and energy use variables used in the econometric analysis. 
  
Energy tax exempt  
from 2011/2012 
 Control  
 
Total 
Variable Mean SD Obs Mean SD Obs Mean SD Obs 
Gross output 2010, in million euros 98 125 128 22 29 116 62 100 244 
Revenue 2010, in million euros 89 119 127 22 31 115 57 94 242 
Value added 2010, in million euros 19 22 128 7 12 116 13 19 244 
Wages per employee 2010,  
in 1000 euros 
40 10 126 38 16 115 39 13 241 
Employees 2010 184 193 128 85 117 116 137 169 244 
Total energy use 2010, in TJ 767 1383 128 65 120 116 433 1063 244 
Energy efficiency 2010, eur/GJ 669 1451 128 931 1462 116 794 1459 244 
Share of electricity use 2010 0,35 0,22 128 0,44 0,23 116 0,39 0,23 244 
Share of multiplant firms 0,91   128 0,41   116 0,67   244 
Notes: We report the summary statistics of the plants for which information is available for the pre-treatment years and years 
2015-2016. The matched control group is restricted to plants in the same TOL 2008 two-digit industry sectors as exempt plants. 
The matching algorithm matches each exempt plant to many control plants. Matching is carried out with replacement, in order to 
avoid issues arising from the order in which matches for each plant are selected. The overall number of matched controls is 
slightly smaller than the number of treated plants, which indicates that the same control plants are used as matches for several 
treated plants. 
 
  
                                                     
 
9 The 50 000 euro deductible on energy tax refunds favors large tax paying units.  
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Table 5.2. Descriptive statistics on the energy use variables 
  
Energy tax exempt  
from 2011/2012 
 Control  
 
Total 
Variable Mean SD Obs Mean SD Obs Mean SD Obs 
Electricity use 2010, TJ 264 685 125 21 44 116 147 508 241 
Share of electricity use 2010 0,35 0,22 128 0,44 0,23 116 0,39 0,23 244 
Heat use 2010, TJ 250 401 78 25 52 62 150 320 140 
Share of heat use 2010 0,33 0,32 128 0,19 0,24 116 0,26 0,29 244 
Coal use 2010, TJ 635 531 4 .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Share of coal use 2010 0,01 0,06 128 0,01 0,07 116 0,01 0,06 244 
Gas use 2010, TJ 654 985 19 86 169 12 434 820 31 
Share of gas use 2010 0,08 0,22 128 0,06 0,19 116 0,07 0,21 244 
Peat use 2010, TJ 784 550 8 .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Share of peat use 2010 0,01 0,05 128 0,00 0,01 116 0,01 0,04 244 
Light fuel oil use 2010, TJ 9 38 52 4 7 63 6 26 115 
Share of light fuel oil use 2010 0,03 0,10 128 0,10 0,21 116 0,06 0,16 244 
Heavy fuel oil use 2010, TJ 75 125 25 56 70 12 69 109 37 
Share of heavy fuel oil use 2010 0,03 0,11 128 0,05 0,17 116 0,04 0,14 244 
Wood fuels 2010, TJ 513 614 31 41 61 21 322 527 52 
Share of wood use 2010 0,14 0,28 128 0,10 0,24 116 0,12 0,26 244 
Notes: The number of observations for the quantity of each fuel type used indicates the number of plants that reported a positive 
quantity for the fuel in question. Notation “..” means that fewer than 3 observations were available for the cell, and descriptive 
statistics cannot be reported due to privacy constraints. We report the summary statistics of the plants for which information is 
available for the pre-treatment years and years 2015-2016. The matched control group is restricted to plants in the same TOL 
2008 two-digit industry sectors as exempt plants. The matching algorithm matches each exempt plant to many control plants. 
Matching is carried out with replacement, in order to avoid issues arising from the order in which matches for each plant are 
selected. The overall number of matched controls is slightly smaller than the number of treated plants, which indicates that the 
same control plants are used as matches for several treated plants. 
 
 
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 display distributions of the outcome variables for the last pre-treat-
ment year 2010. In so far as the distributions overlap, we can be ensured that the exempt 
plants can be matched with non-exempt plants that had similar outcomes prior to the 
2011 energy tax reform. The distributions demonstrate only partial overlap for gross out-
put, revenue, value added, employees and total energy use. This means that plants in 
the upper tail of the exempt plants’ distribution for total energy use, for example, are 
compared to plants that are smaller in terms of total energy use. In terms of the variables 
used for matching, 80 percent of the exempt plants are within the support of the empirical 
distribution for year 2010 total energy use of the controls. All of the exempt plants are 
within the support of the empirical distribution of year 2010 electricity share of the con-
trols. This means that for about 80 percent of the exempt plants it is be possible to find 
matches that are similar to them in terms of pre-treatment energy use. Thus, about 20 
percent of exempt plants are compared to plants that are smaller in terms of their pre-
treatment energy use.  
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While the newly tax exempt plans are larger than the control plants in terms of scale, the 
two groups are more similar in terms of variables measuring intensity (Figure 5.2). For 
wages per employee, the share of electricity in total energy use, and energy efficiency 
the distributions for exempt plants are overlapped by the distributions of the matched 
control plants. Recall also that we enforce strict matching within each TOL 2008 two digit 
industry – that is, the matches for each treated plant are selected from the same industry 
as the treated plant. 
 
The bottom right panel of Figure 5.2 displays the ratio of electricity to total expenditure 
for the exempt and matched non-exempt plants. The ratio of electricity to total expendi-
ture is an alternative proxy for the energy tax burden of plants. As Figure 5.2 shows, the 
exempt and matched non-exempt plants exhibit similar, overlapping distributions for the 
ratio of electricity to total expenditure.10 Thus, if the objective of the energy tax refund 
was to lessen the energy tax burden of the most energy intensive firms, it did not really 
succeed in sorting out only particularly energy intensive operators. The energy tax refund 
is determined based more on the scale  of energy use than the intensity of energy use, 
with the consequence that plants with similar energy intensities can receive different tax 
treatment.  
 
Overall the summary statistics and distributions for the pre-treatment values of the out-
come variables highlight a limitation of our matching strategy. Ideally, we would like to 
match each newly exempt plant with a large number of control plants in the same indus-
try with similar historic outcomes. However, the number of control plants with very similar 
historic scale outcomes is limited. In order to avoid potential bias created by pre-treat-
ment differences, our matching procedure is combined with a difference-in-differences 
approach. That is, we do not compare outcomes (for example, revenue) between newly 
tax exempt matched non-exempt plants, but the change in the outcome (for example, 
revenue) between 2010 (before the tax reform) and post-reform years. Thus, the identi-
fication strategy is based on the assumption that conditional on the matching covariates, 
the outcomes of the exempt plants and non-exempt control plants would have followed 
parallel trends had the tax exemption not been extended to include the newly exempt 
plants in 2011-2012. The following section will start with a comparison of the pre-treat-
ment trends in the outcome variables.  
 
  
                                                     
 
10 Due to many missing values for total expenditure, a variable not used in our analysis otherwise, 
in the last pre-treatment year 2010, the ratio of electricity use to total expenditure was computed 
as the average for all the pre-treatment years 2007-2010 in our data.  
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Figure 5.1. Comparison of pre-treatment distributions of outcome variables for newly exempt (from 
2011/2012 onwards) plants and matched non-exempt plants  
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Figure 5.2. Comparison of pre-treatment distributions of outcome variables for newly exempt (from 
2011/2012 onwards) plants and matched non-exempt plants  
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6 Results 
We start out by plotting graphs of the economic and energy outcomes of the newly 
exempt plants and the matched control plants both before the 2011 energy tax reform 
and the change in the tax exemption threshold. The graphs in Figures 6.1 to 6.3 serve 
both to illustrate the post-reform differences, if any, in the outcomes of the newly exempt 
and non-exempt plants, and to evaluate the underlying assumption of parallel trends. 
While it is not possible to test the assumption of parallel trends in the outcomes of the 
tax exempt and matched control plants had the tax exemption rule not been changed, 
the assumption is more plausible if the two groups exhibited parallel trends prior to the 
2011 tax reform. 
Based on visual observation, the trends for the outcome variables mostly follow parallel 
trends prior to 2011. Only for value added, we observe slightly different movement be-
tween 2007 and 2008. Statistical tests confirm this visual observation.11 The trends also 
remain roughly parallel for the exempt and non-exempt plants after 2011 although there 
is notable year to year variation. No unidirectional difference is apparent in the move-
ments of gross output, revenue, value added or wages for the two groups of plants. For 
employees, total energy use and gross output relative to energy use (a measure of en-
ergy efficiency) there is a gap between the exempt and non-exempt firms that seems to 
widen some for gross output relative to energy use, and close some for employment 
towards the end of the period that our data cover.  
 
Table 6.1 shows how significant the differences in the outcomes of the exempt and non-
exempt plants are from a statistical point of view. Our outcomes of interest are the 
changes in plant-level economic performance and energy use measures. For a long-
term view of the overall effects of the tax exemption on the plants that became exempt 
in 2011-2012, we analyze changes in plant-level outcomes between the last pre-treat-
ment year 2010 and years 2015-2016. We report results generated using log trans-
formed data, so the average treatment effect on the treated12 can be interpreted as the 
estimated average effect in percentage terms. Standard error estimates have been con-
structed using the Abadie and Imbens (2006) variance formula. Exempt plants were 
matched to the five nearest neighbors within the same TOL 2008 two-digit industry.  
 
Recall that the estimates in Table 6.1. compare the most recent years in the data, 2016-
2015, to the last pre-reform year 2010. The estimated coefficient for gross output is -
                                                     
 
11 We reject the null hypothesis on no trend difference at the 95 percent level for value added in 
2009 and for employees in 2008, that is, in two out of 21 hypothesis tests.  
12 That is, the average effect of the energy tax exemption on plants that have been exempt from 
2011-2012 onwards and were not exempt prior to 2011.  
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0,37, which suggests that gross output grew on average 37 percentage points less be-
tween 2010 and 2015-2016 among exempt plants than among non-exempt plants. The 
coefficient is significant at the 1 percent level. However, the trends for gross output indi-
cate substantial year to year variation in the average gross output development. The 
long-term view presented here should in further research be complemented by an overall 
view for the post-reform years. Nonetheless, the descriptive evidence in Figure 6.1 does 
not suggest that the overall view would differ from the long-term view in terms of the 
direction of the impact.  
 
The gross output variable measures the value of a plant’s output. Thus, the negative 
effect on gross output is consistent both with firms producing less, and with firms charg-
ing lower prices. We cannot distinguish between these two responses as we do not ob-
serve plants’ physical output. 
 
The estimated coefficients for revenue, value added, wages per employee, employees 
and total energy use are not statistically significant at conventional levels. The point es-
timate for revenue is negative, for value added positive but much smaller in magnitude. 
The point estimate for wages is negative, the point estimate for employees positive. Both 
are close to zero in magnitude. The 95 percent intervals for these coefficients are quite 
wide and encompass both negative and positive values. Thus, for these outcome varia-
bles both negative and positive effects are reasonably compatible with the data. Overall, 
the results are most compatible with the energy tax exemption having no effect on the 
long-run growth in revenue, value added, wages, employees or total energy use, among 
the plants that have been tax exempt from the 2011 reform onwards.  
 
The estimated coefficient for energy efficiency (gross output per total energy use) is 
-0,52 . The coefficient is significant at the 1 percent level. Thus, plants that became tax 
exempt in 2011-2012 appear to have become less energy efficient between 2010 and 
2015-2016 whereas the energy efficiency of non-exempt plants has overall remained 
close to its 2010 level (Figure 6.3). The results suggest a widening gap between the 
energy efficiency of the newly exempt and non-exempt plants, to the benefit of the non-
exempt plants. However, as our measure of gross output is not a physical but a monetary 
one, the result does not necessarily indicate that newly exempt firms are using more 
energy per unit of physical output – it could be the case that the negative effect on energy 
efficiency stems from charging lower prices rather than different developments in the 
amount of output produced per unit of energy. 
 
The trends in the outcome variables shown in Figures 6.1 to 6.3 exhibit notable year to 
year variation. This should be born in mind when interpreting the results. For most out-
come variables, no clear pattern emerges for the differences between the plants that first 
became tax exempt after the 2011-2012 energy tax changes, and non-exempt plants. 
Based on visual observation, the difference is unidirectional to a degree for gross output 
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and energy efficiency. Overall the initial results presented here are most compatible with 
no important effect of the energy tax exemption on revenue, value added, wages, em-
ployees or total energy use and a negative impact on gross output and energy efficiency. 
The results refer to the average effect of the tax refunds on plants that first became tax 
exempt in 2011-2012, after the energy tax refund system was extended by lowering the 
exemption threshold.  
 
Figure 6.1. Gross output, revenue and value added for newly exempt (from 2011/2012 onwards) plants and 
matched non-exempt plants, 2007-2016 
  
 
 
 
Note: Graphical representation of the difference-in-differences approach. The effect of the energy tax exemption 
is assessed statistically by comparing the trends of the exempt plants and the matched non-exempt plants. Nota-
tion: treatment group includes plants that became tax exempt in 2011/2012, control group matched non-exempt 
plants.  
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Figure 6.2. Wages and employees for newly exempt (from 2011/2012 onwards) plants and matched non-ex-
empt plants, 2007-2016 
  
Note: Graphical representation of the difference-in-differences approach. The effect of the energy tax exemption 
is assessed statistically by comparing the trends of the exempt plants and the matched non-exempt plants. Nota-
tion: treatment group includes plants that became tax exempt in 2011/2012, control group matched non-exempt 
plants.  
 
Figure 6.3. Total energy use and energy efficiency (gross output per energy use) for newly exempt (from 
2011/2012 onwards) plants and matched non-exempt plants, 2007-2016 
  
Note: Graphical representation of the difference-in-differences approach. The effect of the energy tax exemption 
is assessed statistically by comparing the trends of the exempt plants and the matched non-exempt plants. Nota-
tion: treatment group includes plants that became tax exempt in 2011/2012, control group matched non-exempt 
plants.  
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Table 6.1. The average effect of the energy tax exemption on 2015-2016 outcomes 
Dependent variable Gross out-
put 
(Log) 
Revenue 
(Log) 
Value added 
(Log) 
Wages 
per em-
ployee 
(Log) 
Employees 
(Log) 
Total energy 
use (Log) 
Energy efficiency 
(Log) 
Coefficient -0,39*** -0,18 0,03 -0,03 0,01 -0,08 -0,52*** 
SE 0,10 0,16 0,16 0,05 0,07 0,08 0,11 
p 0,00 0,26 0,87 0,53 0,89 0,31 0,00 
Lower bound of 95 percent 
confidence interval -0,57 -0,48 -0,29 -0,12 -0,13 -0,24 -0,73 
Upper bound of 95 percent 
confidence interval -0,20 0,13 0,33 0,06 0,16 0,08 -0,31 
Number of observations 244 243 236 244 246 246 245 
Number of treated 128 127 119 127 129 129 128 
Number of controls 116 116 117 117 117 117 117 
 
The initial results are in line with both the results for Finland’s energy tax refunds in Harju 
et al. (2016) and on other empirical papers on the impact of energy prices differences 
on manufacturing firm performance. We complement the work in Harju et al. (2016) by 
adding a more long-term view – where Harju et al. (2016) only had data for the three 
post-reform years 2012-2014, we are able to look at a time period five years after the 
reform, where plants will have had more time to adjust to the changes in the tax sched-
ule. We analyze more detailed plant-level data, where Harju et al. (2016) considered 
firm-level (tax identification number) information. We use an identification strategy that 
allows for estimating the causal impact of the tax exemption policy, where Harju et al. 
(2016) analyzed the association of the tax exemptions with firm performance. We also 
added data on plants’ energy use, not included in the analysis by Harju et al. (2016). 
Overall, our results are in line with those by Harju et al. (2016). Harju et al. found no 
evidence of a robust, statistically significant association between energy tax refunds and 
firm performance. Our findings are most compatible with no effect on other measures of 
manufacturing plant performance, but a negative impact on the growth of gross output, 
due either to less output or charging lower prices. Figure 6.1. suggests that this discrep-
ancy between our results and those in Harju et al. (2016) could perhaps be explained by 
the difference in the time periods that the two analyses focus on. Future analysis apply-
ing our identification strategy to the period 2012-2016 would shed light on how likely this 
conjecture is likely to be correct.  
The initial findings are also in line with other research that has studied the effects of 
similar tax exemptions on manufacturing firm performance in other EU countries. Gerster 
and Lamp (2018) analyzed a tax exemption to large manufacturing plants in Germany. 
Newly exempt plants were found to increase their energy use some but their sales did 
not increase. The number of employees in newly exempt plants decreased some, which 
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Gerster and Lamp suggest could be because they substituted bought electricity for gen-
eration on site. Flues and Lutz (2015) studied the effects of German electricity taxation 
exploiting a threshold in the electricity tax system, which assigned a lower tax rate to 
industries with high electricity use. They found no effect of the tax relief on firm revenue, 
exports, value added, investments or employment. Martin et al. (2014) analyzed the ef-
fects of energy taxes in the United Kingdom, where energy-intensive manufacturing firms 
were granted an 80 percent concession in their energy taxes if they committed to volun-
tary agreements to reduce their energy use or carbon emissions. Martin et al. found that 
paying the full tax had no effect on production, productivity or employment but that it 
reduced firm energy intensity notably relative to firms that obtained the tax relief.  
When interpreting the results, the cost saving provided by the energy tax exemption may 
provide some perspective. The average cost saving in terms of total expenditure is on 
the order of 1 percent. In terms of electricity costs, the saving provided by the tax ex-
emption averages 6 percent. Marin and Vona (2017) utilized a detailed data set on man-
ufacturing plant energy expenditure and energy use and found energy prices to have a 
small negative impact on employment and productivity: a 10 percent increase in energy 
prices decreased employment by 2,6 percent and productivity by 1,1 percent. Given the 
size of the average electricity price difference generated by Finland’s energy tax exemp-
tion, an overall employment increase of 1,6 percent would have been in line with Marin 
and Vona’s results. Possible explanations for the divergence between Marin and Vona’s 
results and ours, of no statistically significant effect on employment, could be the size of 
the electricity cost differential or different industrial structures; Finland’s tax exemption 
applies primarily to process industries whereas Marin and Vona examined a wide range 
of industries including both process industries and discrete manufacturing.    
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7 Conclusion 
The results presented in the previous section are overall most compatible with no im-
portant effect of the energy tax exemption on revenue, value added, wages, employees 
or total energy use, and a negative impact on gross output and energy efficiency. The 
results refer to the average effect of the tax refunds on plants that first became tax ex-
empt in 2011-2012. There are several possible explanations for the negative effect on 
gross output. First, as outlined in Section 3.2, the mechanism through which one would 
expect the energy tax refund to affect manufacturing firms export performance is cost 
competitiveness. The negative effect on gross output is consistent both with firms pro-
ducing less, and with firms charging lower prices. We cannot distinguish between these 
two responses as we do not observe the quantity of plants’ physical output but only the 
value of output in monetary terms. Charging lower prices would be consistent with the 
assertion that lower unit costs enable producers to reduce their prices and increase their 
sales. One would then anticipate that the effect on revenue would go in the same direc-
tion as the effect on gross output. The estimated effect on revenue is not statistically 
significant, but the point estimate is negative.  
 
Overall the results are most compatible with no important effect on the number of em-
ployees, wages or energy use, which would be consistent with the effect on gross output 
arising from charging lower prices rather than reducing the quantity of output. On the 
other hand, the industries eligible for the energy tax refunds are capital intensive process 
industries, and relatively small output changes may not be manifested as notable 
changes in employment or energy use. For example in the lumber and paper industries, 
raw materials are a significant cost item (44 percent and 38 percent in 2013, respectively, 
according to Viitanen and Mutanen 2015). Whether output changes are reflected more 
notably in raw material inputs than in labor and energy inputs would be an interesting 
further research question.   
 
Electricity use relative to total expenses follows a similar distribution among exempt and 
matched non-exempt plants. If using this measure for energy intensity, the tax refund 
system does not really succeed in sorting out only particularly energy intensive operators 
as refund recipients. The energy tax refund is determined based more on the scale of 
energy use than the intensity of energy use, with the consequence that plants with similar 
energy intensities can receive different tax treatment.  
 
The results presented here are the first results of a larger research agenda. They will be 
complemented with an overall view for the years 2012-2016 as well as alternative match-
ing specifications to study the robustness of the results to different matching covariates. 
Comparison of investment behavior among exempt and matched non-exempt plants 
would be an interesting extension in that could help distinguish whether lower prices or 
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less output per unit of energy is the more likely explanation for the negative effect on 
energy efficiency. Future work on possible effects on the use of raw material inputs would 
also be informative in terms of explaining the missing employment and energy use im-
pacts. 
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